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ARTICLES
DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL
MODELING IN LAW: THE CASE OF
DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION
FRED S. MCCHESNEY*
"[W]hat the courts do is of far more importance than what they say; and if
we find that the courts, although vigorously asserting that a certain body is
not a corporation dejure or de facto, give the stockholders the same rights
and immunities as if it were a de facto corporation, and if we further are
unable to find any other theory on which these rights and immunities can
be supported, we may be justified in saying that the courts have in reality
done what they insist that they are unwilling to do, and have treated the
organization as a de facto corporation."
- Merrick Dodd
(Harvard Law Review 1)
* Robert T. Thompson Professor of Law and Business and Professor of Economics, Emory
University. Research and editorial assistance from Virginia Carron is acknowledged with particular
gratitude, as is advice on the empirical model from Christopher Curran and Jinook Jeong. Very
helpful comments on an earlier draft were provided by Jennifer Arlen, Ian Ayres, Frank Buckley,
William Carney, Louis De Alessi, Deborah DeMott, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein, Jill Fisch,
David Haddock, Robert Hamilton, D. Bruce Johnsen, Andrew Kleit, Jonathan Macey, Geoffrey
Miller, Richard Posner, Mark Ramseyer, Roberta Romano, and Mark Zupan. Improvements sug-
gested by Theodore Eisenberg and Robert Thompson were especially useful. Comments from par-
ticipants in presentations at the following are also acknowledged with gratitude: the University of
Chicago, George Mason University, University of Kansas, Northwestern University, and the annual
meetings of the Southern and Western Economic Associations and the American Law and Econom-
ics Association.
1. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40
HARV. L. REv. 521, 531-2 (1927).
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"When the final showdown came to pass/A law book was no good."
- Gene Pitney
(The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance 2)
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article has two purposes. Substantively, it investigates and seeks
to explain courts' decisions concerning "defective incorporation." In nu-
merous cases, courts purport to specify conditions under which a firm's
owners who failed to satisfy the statutory formalities requisite to forming
a legal (de jure) corporation may be deemed, nevertheless, to have lim-
ited liability. Under the doctrines of "de facto corporation" and "corpo-
ration by estoppel," courts hold that despite the failure to create a legal
corporation, a constructive corporation was formed and thus the firm
owners are shielded by limited liability.
Legal commentators have largely despaired, however, of specifying ex
ante the factors that will incline a court to apply these defective incorpo-
ration doctrines and grant limited liability.3 Professor Frey's oft-cited,
extensive review of the cases prior to the first Model Business Corpora-
tion Act (MBCA) concluded that the doctrine "is just so much jargon,"
of such uncertain application that it "ought to be abandoned." 4 Thus,
the MBCA in its various iterations for years sought to achieve legal cer-
tainty by banning limited liability in cases of defective incorporation.-
Those attempts were largely unsuccessful; courts have clung to their dis-
cretion to grant limited liability despite failure to satisfy the statutory
formalities.6 A recent update of Frey's survey finds that in the post-
Model-Act cases the standards applied by courts remain "fuzzy" and
2. H. DAVID & B. BACHARACH, THE MAN WHO SHOT LIBERTY VALANCE, (Famous Music
Corp., ASCAP).
3. See, eg., Alexander H. Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 1153 (1952); NORMAN D. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 170-200 (2d ed. 1971); AL-
FRED H. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 245-50 (1976); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 326-44 (3d ed. 1983).
4. Frey, supra note 3, at 1178. Frey's review of the defective incorporation cases is "exhaus-
tive" and continues to be cited as the best review of the common law of defective incorporation.
Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 123 &
n.189 (1991). For another discussion of Frey's "extensive compilation of cases," see Thilo von
Bodungen, The Defective Corporation in American and German Law, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 313, 319-
20 & n.24 (1967).
5. See infra note 10.
6. See infra text at notes 37-39.
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unpredictable.7
The first purpose of this Article is to suggest that more substance may
exist in the defective incorporation cases than has been evident hereto-
fore. The Article investigates the reasons for the apparent fuzziness and
proposes alternative grounds for explaining the cases explored. In partic-
ular, recent learning about the standards that courts apply in piercing the
corporate veil offers a different perspective on the rationale underlying
defective incorporation doctrines. Because the issues presented in the
two sorts of cases are very similar, one naturally wonders whether the
criteria judges invoke in piercing the veil decisions are also influential in
defective incorporation decisions.
Second, the Article suggests that the difficulty of identifying standards
in any line of cases, including defective incorporation, may lie as much in
deficiencies of legal research techniques as in any judicial "fuzziness."
Rarely, if ever, do judges claim to rely on only a single factor in deciding
disputes in a given domain of law. Rather, judges announce a number of
factors, each of which, all other things equal, will make a decision for one
side or the other more likely. With several factors at work simultane-
ously, predicting judicial outcomes becomes a more complicated task
which, therefore, requires more sophisticated statistical techniques. This
Article uses one such method, multiple regression, to determine, from
the same sample used by Frey, the relative importance of different factors
that might explain judges' decisions in defective incorporation cases.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II reviews the defective in-
corporation doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by estop-
pel. Part II then notes the similarity between the issues of defective
incorporation and piercing the corporate veil. Part III presents a statisti-
cal analysis of the defective incorporation cases, modeling limited liabil-
ity as a function of the various factors identified. As discussed in Part
IV, the empirical results support several new inferences concerning de-
fective incorporation and indicate also why traditional legal modes of
doctrinal analysis are often insufficient.
II. THE LAW OF DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION
A. Background
By statute, corporations come into existence upon the performance of
7. Wayne N. Bradley, Comment, An Empirical Study of Defective Incorporation, EMORY L.J.
523, 574 (1990).
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certain formalities. These formalities have traditionally included filing
the articles of incorporation with some state functionary (typically the
Secretary of State), the owners' payment into the firm of a certain mini-
mum capital, and so forth.8 Completion of the statutory requirements
makes the firm a de jure corporation, with limited liability for its
stockholders.9
The problem of defective incorporation usually arises when the firm's
incorporators have not completed one or more of the statutory condi-
tions precedent to the formation of a de jure corporation, but owners or
other parties--often unaware of any deficiency and believing a valid cor-
poration to exist-undertake to act on behalf of the supposed corpora-
tion.'0 When a plaintiff allegedly injured by the firm files suit and learns
that the firm has insufficient assets to satisfy a judgment, the plaintiff
then discovers that the firm in fact was not a valid corporation. The
plaintiff then seeks to satisfy any judgment against the owners' personal
assets as well.
Determining whether and under what circumstances to shield firm
owners from personal liability in a defectively incorporated firm has
vexed courts since general incorporation statues were first promulgated.
The problems derive to a considerable extent from the conflicting over-
laps among three related areas of law: contract, agency, and partnership.
Under traditional contract law, the parties' intentions would decide the
dispute. If both parties intended limited liability to apply to dealings
between them, then no personal liability would come about in the event
of subsequent breach of contract. Statutory compliance would be irrele-
vant. If the parties' understandings with respect to personal liability
were different, the rules of contract for unilateral mistake would then
operate." The contract rules would not, of course, apply to torts com-
8. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (hereinafter RMBCA), Ann. §§ 2.02,
2.03. Minimum capital requirements now have disappeared from the typical state incorporation
statute. Other traditional requirements include organizational meetings, adoption of by-laws, elec-
tion of directors, and issuance of shares.
9. Id. § 6.22.
10. The various versions of the MBCA have attempted to limit or abolish judicial discretion to
award limited liability when a dejure corporation has not been achieved. Some courts have followed
the letter of the statute. See, eg., Timberline Equipment Co. v. Davenport, 514 P.2d 1109 (Or.
1973); Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964). But in most jurisdictions courts have
continued to grant limited liability to owners of defectively incorporated firms, usually without dis-
tinguishing or even discussing the applicable corporation statute. See generally Bradley, supra note
7.
11. See, e.g., 17 AM. JUR. 2D §§ 146-49.
[Vol. 71:493
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/1
DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION
mitted in pursuit of the supposed corporation's business.
Traditional agency principles, however, would dictate a different set of
results. A firm's agent who purported to contract with others on the
basis that the firm was a corporation, when it was not, would effectively
act as an agent for a nonexistent principal. The agent then would be
personally liable.12 This would be true whether the agent was an owner
or not. A purely "passive" owner would not be directly liable when an
agent (including an agent-owner) acted for a nonexistent principal.
However, a passive owner might be vicariously liable, depending whether
the court deemed that the agent was acting on behalf of the (non-corpo-
rate) firm within the scope of his employment.
Under the law of partnership, a third set of rules would apply. If own-
ers of a firm are not legally incorporated, they satisfy the common-law
and statutory definitions of a partnership: co-owners of a business being
operated for a profit.13 If so, the acts of any owner or even an agent in
furtherance of the firm's business make all owners personally liable. 4
The differences are perhaps seen more easily by example. Suppose that
A and B own a firm and that B has contracted with vendor C in the
ordinary course of the firm's business. Suppose also that B claims incor-
rectly to C that the business is a corporation. If the sales contract is
breached, but the firm has insufficient assets to compensate the seller (C),
the fact that both sides dealt on the basis that the firm was a corporation
would mean that neither A nor B would be personally liable under stan-
dard contract principles. Application of agency law, however, would
hold any agent (including owner B) who contracted on the basis that his
firm was a corporation personally liable because no such corporation
(i.e., principal) existed. Owner A, not involved in the formation of the
contract, could be vicariously liable if the agent-owner was acting within
the scope of his employment. A court would certainly adjudge owner A
liable if the court deemed the firm a partnership. As for a tort committed
by B against C, the contract theory by definition provides no decision
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 326, 330.
13. Uniform Partnership Act, § 6.
14. In other words, there is a default concept that a multi-owner firm that is not a legal corpo-
ration must be a partnership, and thus that all owners must be liable for the acts of agents (including
owners) within the scope of employment. For an early argument along those lines, see Dodd, supra
note 1. That view has never met with unanimous approval and rests on questionable premises. See
Calvert Magruder, A Note on Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40
HARV. L. REv. 733 (1927) (objecting to the claim that "the legal waifs and strays which have been
rejected for the corporation fold must be embraced within the partnership family").
1993]
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rule. The agency rule would again hold only the tortfeasor (B) directly
liable but might hold A vicariously liable. Partnership principles would
deem all owners liable for the acts committed by an agent (including a
co-owner) within the scope of his employment.
B. De Facto Incorporation and Corporation by Estoppel
The contract, agency, and partnership rules and modes of analysis dis-
cussed above are perfectly general. Using them to solve a problem of
defective incorporation would involve the familiar lawyerly task of ap-
plying legal rules established in one context to factual situations encoun-
tered more frequently in another. But with well established common-law
rules yielding somewhat disparate results (depending whether contract,
agency or partnership law is applied), courts instead have fashioned a
separate set of corporate law doctrines to deal with the specific problems
of defective incorporation."5 If individual owner-defendants can estab-
lish that the firm was nonetheless a "de facto corporation," they will be
protected by limited liability just as if a true de jure corporation had been
perfected by completion of the statutory requirements. Similarly, if the
court treats the firm as a "corporation by estoppel," defendants will be
protected by limited liability. Both doctrines draw somewhat from com-
mon-law principles of contract, agency, and partnership, but neither is
perfectly consistent with any one body of law. 6
Three requirements are typically cited for application of the de facto
corporation doctrine.'" There must have been: (1) a statute in existence
by which incorporation was legally possible; (2) a "colorable" attempt to
comply with the statute; and (3) some actual use or exercise of corporate
15. But see Johnson v. Corser, 25 N.W. 799 (Minn. 1886) (unusual case in which the defective
incorporation issue was resolved as a contract question).
Courts often justify going outside the common-law principles because the corporation is said to be
a creature of statute, not voluntary private orderings like contract, agency, or partnership. Ribstein,
supra note 4, at 120-24. However, Professor Warren suggested years ago that the doctrine of de
facto corporation, at least, has a common-law basis in judges' forbidding anyone other than the state
to challenge a state's grant of any authority by statute. Edward H. Warren, Collateral Attack on
Incorporation, 20 HARV. L. REv. 456, 456-57 (1907).
16. For example, the corporation by estoppel doctrine rests on legal principles only partly
linked to estoppel in contract law. "A problem with the estoppel theory is that it is not a single
theory, but a cluster of very different rules covering cases that fall into very different categories.
Only one of these categories involves a true estoppel, that is, reliance by one party on the other's
representation." WILLIAM L. CARY AND MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 148 (6th ed. 1988).
17. See, eg., Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 398 A.2d 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979).
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privileges. Because every state has a corporation statute and defendants
ordinarily have been acting under the aegis of a supposed corporation,
the three factors typically dissolve into one: whether defendants' at-
tempts to incorporate had gone far enough to be deemed "colorable com-
pliance." For example, an attempt to file the articles of incorporation,
albeit unsuccessful, has frequently sufficed as the necessary attempt at
statutory compliance.1" "In addition, some cases and commentators
have added good faith of corporation or associates as a fourth element.
[The good faith requirement] is often omitted, however, because a colora-
ble compliance with the incorporation statute usually encompasses a
good faith attempt to incorporate." 19
When the firm does not meet the requirements for a de facto corpora-
tion, limited liability may nonetheless be granted under the rules of cor-
poration by estoppel. By that doctrine, a party who deals with the firm,
believing a de jure corporation exists, will be estopped in subsequent liti-
gation from denying a corporate existence. For example, a creditor who
extends a loan to a firm, believing erroneously that it is a corporation,
will be estopped to deny corporateness and seek satisfaction against own-
ers personally in any legal action on the debt. The firm need not make an
attempt to comply with the statute. In the typical case, for example, the
firm owners have agreed privately as to the articles of incorporation, but
the attorney handling the matter fails to file them.2"
The generally acknowledged formulae for the two doctrines have sev-
eral implications. First, for de facto corporate status to be granted, the
three or four factors listed above are supposedly sufficient: where they are
present, limited liability should follow. On the other hand, these requi-
sites are not necessary for limited liability in the face of defective incor-
poration, because corporation by estoppel does not require them. By the
same token, there is a single requirement for corporation by estoppel,
which also is sufficient for a grant of limited liability: plaintiff's willing-
ness to deal with the firm on the basis of limited liability.
Second, de facto corporate status apparently depends on what defend-
ants have done-whether a good faith attempt to comply with the statute
was made-not on anything that plaintiffs have or have not done. This is
in keeping with the fundamental reason offered for the de facto doctrine,
18. Id.
19. HENN AND ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 330 (citations omitted).
20. Frey, supra note 3, at 1158. See, e.g., Cranson v. International Business Machines Corp.,
200 A.2d 33 (Md. 1964).
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
500 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
that a defendant who has in good faith tried but failed by a mere techni-
cality to complete the statutory requirements ought not suffer such harsh
punishment as personal liability. 1 However, in estoppel cases, a plain-
tiff's belief that he is dealing with a corporation, rather than what de-
fendants have done or failed to do, is supposedly the controlling factor.
Thus, defendant's ability to establish that the conditions for de facto sta-
tus had been fulfilled would essentially render irrelevant whether plaintiff
had dealt with the firm as a corporate entity.22
Third, no relevant distinction would exist, for purposes of the de facto
corporation doctrine, between tort and contract disputes. Limited liabil-
ity would be accorded even against a tort-victim plaintiff as long as the
court found that the defendant had in good faith attempted compliance.
But the distinction between contract and tort would be of considerable
importance in cases involving corporation by estoppel, because outside
parties ordinarily learn about the firm's supposed corporate form only in
the course of contractual dealings.23
Last, under neither doctrine is the grant of limited liability affected by
defendants' actions in the day-to-day operations of the firm. Owners ac-
tive in the firm would be just as likely as purely passive ones to benefit
from the defective incorporation doctrines.24 The issues would be simply
whether there had been a good faith colorable attempt at compliance (de
facto corporation) or whether plaintiff was content to deal with the firm
on a corporate basis (corporation by estoppel).
In jurisdictions recognizing the doctrines of de facto corporation and
corporation by estoppel, there is virtual unanimity as to the elements of
each. As a practical matter, though, case reviews by legal commentators
have repeatedly found that courts do not generally follow the supposed
requirements-indeed, it is not clear that courts understand the differ-
21. See, eg. LATTIN, supra note 3, at 183.
22. "Mhe would-be shareholders would not need to resort to the estoppel theory if they could
establish that their business had de facto corporate status." CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at
149.
23. "[Ihe nub of the estoppel theory in such cases is that the third party has dealt with the
business as if it were a corporation. Presumably, therefore, the theory would not apply to a tort
claimant, or other involuntary creditor, who was a stranger to the business before his claim arose. In
contrast, the de facto theory can be applied to such claimants." CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 16,
at 149.
24. Of course, active owners who themselves were tortfeasors would be personally liable, re-
gardless whether the firm was deemed a corporation.
[Vol. 71:493
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ence between the two.2 5 Consider the following judicial explanation:
the de facto status of the corporation suffices to absolve [defendant] from
individual liability. Plaintiffs in effect are estopped from attacking the legal
existence of the corporation collaterally because of the nonfiling [of the arti-
cles of incorporation] in order to impose liability on the individual when
they have admittedly contracted with a corporate entity which had de facto
status.",
26
With the separate elements of the two doctrines so frequently confused, it
is not surprising that reviews of the cases also find that few of the impli-
cations of the two doctrines have held.
1. Attempted Compliance and Corporate Dealings
In his classic empirical article on the de facto corporation, Frey looked
at 72 cases in three categories of de facto corporations, all involving acts
that seemingly constituted good faith attempts at compliance with the
applicable statute, but had failed to create de jure corporations.27 The
timing of the Frey Article is noteworthy. It was published at about the
time of the first Model Business Corporation Act, which attempted to
eradicate statutorily any award of limited liability without de jure corpo-
rate status. As discussed further below, the Model Act's antipathy to-
ward limited liability with defective incorporation has much to do with
Frey's own conclusions.
The de facto corporation cases in Frey's sample concerned: (1) local
filing of the articles but failure to file with the Secretary of State, when
both filings were statutorily required; (2) filing with the Secretary of State
but failure to file locally, when both were required; and (3) failure to
meet the statutory requirements of minimum paid-in capital, although
the incorporators correctly filed the articles. In every instance, the incor-
25. As Cary and Eisenberg summarize, "Neither the precise contours of the estoppel theory nor
its relationship to the de facto theory has ever been entirely clear. It is sometimes said that the
estoppel theory differs from the de facto theory in that it is effective for only a specific transaction.
However, the de facto theory also may be effective only for a specific transaction .. " CAREY &
EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 148.
More recently, the importance of the distinction between de facto corporation and corporation by
estoppel as defenses against personal liability has grown because some states have abolished the de
facto corporation doctrine but apparently have preserved corporation by estoppel. See David Bar-
ber, Incorporation Risks: Defective Incorporation and Piercing the Corporate Veil in California, 12
PAC. L.J. 829, 835-44 (1981).
26. Cantor, 398 A.2d at 573.
27. Frey, supra note 3. Frey reports that his sample included "all the reported American
cases" dealing with the defects he discusses. Frey, supra note 3, at 1156. But see infra note 96.
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porators attempted in good faith to comply with the statute, seemingly
meaning that the sufficient condition for grant of limited liability had
been met. Judicial recognition of de facto corporation status would fol-
low automatically.
Yet this does not necessarily happen. Only in slightly more than half
of the cases (42 of 72) did courts accord limited liability. Satisfaction of
the supposed requirements for de facto corporation status thus has not
been sufficient for courts actually to accord limited liability. Bradley's
recent update of Frey's work finds that the sufficiency of attempted com-
pliance has, if anything, declined. His survey of 1970-1989 cases reveals
that courts granted limited liability in only 54 percent (32 of 59) of the
defective incorporation cases involving attempted compliance.2"
Similarly, fulfillment of the supposedly sufficient condition for corpo-
ration by estoppel did not necessarily result in grant of limited liability.
Frey found 38 cases in which no attempt to comply with the statute had
been made, but plaintiffs had dealt with the firm as a corporation. De-
fendants escaped personal liability in only 34 percent of those cases (13 of
the 38).
In Frey's de facto corporation cases, the importance of attempted com-
pliance was reduced even further by the fact that courts awarded limited
liability only when the plaintiff was already dealing with the firm as a
corporation. In no cases where dealings were not on a corporate basis
did defendants' good faith attempts at statutory compliance result in lim-
ited liability. In other words, in all of the cases where courts invoked the
de facto corporation doctrine to uphold limited liability, defendants had
satisfied the test for corporation by estoppel anyway. Courts seemed fre-
quently to confuse the two doctrines, making the relevance of the distinc-
tion even less clear.29
Conversely, Frey's results also indicated that outcomes in the estoppel
cases were apparently influenced by steps defendants had taken to
achieve corporation status. Frey reported two groups of estoppel cases.
In neither was an attempt at statutory compliance made, obviating doc-
trinally the possibility of de facto corporate status. But in one group the
defendants had taken some steps toward incorporation (e.g., drawing up
and signing articles of incorporation) and apparently believed in good
faith that they were acting as a corporation.3" In the second group, the
28. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 542 (Table 2).
29. For a good example of the confusion, see Curtis v. Meeker, 62 Ill. App. 49 (1895).
30. "A typical instance is where the articles are drafted and executed in due form and turned
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firm's principals had no reason to think they were acting as a corpora-
tion, yet held the firm out as such. As long as corporation by estoppel
was the defense, the distinction should make no difference in those cases
where plaintiffs had dealt with the firm as a corporation. Yet limited
liability was granted in 44 percent of the first group of cases (11 of 25)
but almost never (8 percent) in the second group (2 of 13 cases). Thus,
just as estoppel elements appear important in the de facto corporation
cases, the elements of de facto corporate status (attempted compliance)
apparently influence judges to decree corporations by estoppel.
Finally, Frey considered whether courts were influenced by defendant-
owners' being active in the management of the business. It is not clear
why Frey chose to isolate this element. The active-passive criterion
harks back to the agency-law distinctions discussed above, but is never
included in "black letter" law discussions of the defective incorporation
doctrines.3 Doctrinally, neither de facto corporation nor corporation by
estoppel seemingly has anything to do with one's status as an active or
passive owner. Either there was an attempt to incorporate or not; either
plaintiff did or did not deal with the firm as a corporation. But having,
for whatever reason, included the active-passive criterion in his survey,
Frey concluded that the distinction was not "an important factor in pre-
dicting the probable impact of a defect in incorporation upon the liability
of the members."32
2. Criticism of the Doctrines
Given the results, the cases involving defective incorporation have un-
derstandably engendered considerable criticism. Most obviously, the
value of the stated formula for de facto corporate status-an attempt to
comply with a state's corporation statute-seems to supply little gui-
dance to those whom the law would guide. Equally unpredictive, appar-
over to an attorney for recordation, but he neglects to place the articles on any public record...
Frey, supra note 3, at 1158.
31. But see HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 71 (1927): "The most
important problem [in defective incorporation cases], on which there is the greatest conflict of au-
thority, relates to when the associates, active or passive, with or without knowledge of the defects,
may be held personally liable on debts of the supposed incorporation." Ballantine does not explain
why the level of activity in the firm should matter in any judicial decision concerning defective
incorporation.
32. Frey, supra note 3, at 1178. It is worth noting, however, that Frey's factual characteriza-
tions of the cases with respect to owner activity or passivity have been criticized as frequently incor-
rect. Bradley, supra note 7, at 538 n.109. After reading the Frey cases, this author can only agree
with that criticism.
1993]
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ently, is a plaintiff's willingness to deal with the firm as a corporation,
which should, but typically does not, result in declaration of a corpora-
tion by estoppel. The judicial outcomes therefore must depend on other
factors. If these other factors were readily identified ex ante, of course,
the doctrinal formulae could be modified. But more often, the surveys
find no explanation for what these other factors are. Frey summarizes
the cases concerning failure to record the articles of incorporation
locally:
The reasoning to be found in these cases is as unsatisfactory as in those in
the preceding sections. Almost invariably the opinions in favor of the de-
fendants offer in justification the mere assertion that a "de facto" corpora-
tion has been formed, despite the failure to record the articles locally. In
the cases in which the plaintiff's claim against the shareholders personally
is upheld, the opinions do no more than aver that, until the articles are
recorded locally, corporate existence does not begin, or that the sharehold-
ers are subject to the liability of partners. Such statements simply assume
the answer to the issue in question, and do not provide a reason for the
decision.33
The same tautological, conclusory reasoning characterized the cases con-
cerning corporation by estoppel, where Frey found that the cases in
which courts granted limited liability were "not particularly different on
their facts" from those in which courts imputed individual liability. 4 As
an explanation of the cases overall, Frey could offer only this summary:
"The significant distinction is in the attitude of the court. 35
No dissenting voice on this point can be found. Another authority
described the defective incorporation decisions as "a discouraging and
baffling maze.... To classify and generalize the results of the mass of
decisions in this field is a task which is not easy nor are satisfying formu-
lae or mechanical rules ready made to solve all the cases to be ex-
pected."36 For a generation, drafters of successive versions of the MBCA
have tried to extirpate doctrines of defective incorporation from corpo-
rate law.37 At least in part, the antipathy towards limited liability in
33. Frey, supra note 3, at 1168.
34. Frey, supra note 3, at 1162.
35. Frey, supra note 3, at 1162.
36. BALLANTINE, supra note 31 at 71.
37. The position of the Model Act since its inception in 1950 has been simple: limited liability
only attaches when a valid, de jure corporation has been formed. "Under the unequivocal provisions
of the Model Act, any steps short of securing a certificate of incorporation would not constitute
apparent compliance. Therefore a defacto corporation cannot exist under the Model Act." MBCA
Ann. § 56 2, at 205 (1971). This position was relaxed somewhat in 1984 with section 2.04 of the
[Vol. 71:493
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cases of defective incorporation is due to the same apparent lack of prin-
ciple in the case results that Frey and others noted before the advent of
the model statute.38 As recent official commentary on the Model Act
stated, "These doctrines were widely criticized as being confusing, result-
oriented, overlapping and involving legal conceptualism that tended to
hide the true basis for decision."'39
Thus, the traditional approach to legal reasoning-reading a body of
cases and distilling the governing principles to predict future outcomes-
has been declared inapplicable to the issue of defective incorporation. In
the end, the analysis usually offered today arrives at criteria such as
"fairness," "public policy," and avoidance of "injustice." As one leading
treatise states, "Even when the required elements [of a de facto corpora-
tion] are found, the application of the doctrine also depends on the na-
ture of the case and the fairness to the parties under the
circumstances."'  The doctrine of de facto incorporation "must find [its]
support in considerations of public policy."4 The de facto doctrine de-
veloped "[t]o prevent injustices."'42 For corporation by estoppel, "In the
final analysis the circumstances and equities of a particular case
control."
4 3
It is difficult to understand how these newer linguistic formulae ad-
dress the complaints made about the older formulations of the defective
incorporation doctrine. Even if the traditional doctrine was result-driven
RMBCA, which would impose personal liability on those who "act as or on behalf of a corporation,
knowing there was no incorporation under this Act." For discussion, see WILLIAM M. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 3911 (1992).
38. At least two other factors also are given for the aversion shown in the Model Business
Corporation Act to limited liability without de jure corporate status. First, it is said that the doc-
trine is unnecessary because de jure incorporation has been made so easy. "Abolition of the concept
of defacto incorporation, which at best was fuzzy, is a sound result. No reason exists for its continu-
ance under general corporate laws, where the process of acquiring de jure incorporation is both
simple and clear. The vestigial appendage should be removed." MBCA Ann. § 149 4, at 909
(1971). The continuing volume of defective incorporation cases, see Bradley, supra note 7, indicates
that, however simple and clear, the process of incorporation still results in mistakes. Second, it is
claimed that awarding limited liability without performance of the statutory formalities diminishes
the incentive to comply with the statute in the first place. "[To recognize limited liability in this
situation threatens to undermine the incorporation process, since one then may obtain limited liabil-
ity by consistently conducting business in the corporate name." MBCA Ann. § 2.04, at 132 (1992
Supp.).
39. MBCA Ann. § 2.04, at 135 (1992 Supp.).
40. HENN AND ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 329.
41. Warren, supra note 15, at 458.
42. von Bodungen, supra note 4, at 315.
43. HENN AND ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 336.
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or hid the true basis for the decision, words like "fairness" and "justice"
hardly furnish a predictive rationale.' "Fairness" is an especially pecu-
liar description for the corporation by estoppel cases, in which plaintiffs
win more than half the time, despite having freely contracted with de-
fendants on the basis of limited liability only.
One also encounters a variant on the notion of equity, a claim that the
cases can be explained by evolution over time toward a more liberal grant
of limited liability. Says one commentator, "Reflecting the early distrust
of all corporations, courts at first required strict conformity with incor-
poration statutes before bestowing corporate privileges. Later cases
showed a tendency to bend the rules where equity demanded. . .. "'
Some courts have explicitly referred to such a trend in the defective in-
corporation cases.46
However, no one has ever examined whether such a trend actually
exists. On the basis of the cases cited in the Frey Article, Figure 1 re-
ports the percentages of published cases in which limited liability was
awarded, despite the absence of a de jure corporation. As shown, limited
liability apparently was granted with greater frequency in defective incor-
poration cases, at least during the 1890-1930 period. Figure 2, from the
same data, shows the cumulative percentage of defective incorporation
cases in which limited liability was granted. This percentage generally
increases during the period of the Frey sample.
Although the trend has been of interest to both commentators and
judges, its doctrinal importance is rather unclear. There is no principled
reason why, absent a change in the factual composition of the cases
themselves, judges should increasingly be inclined to grant limited liabil-
ity in defective incorporation cases. But one cannot tell from the trend
whether the cases themselves have changed over time in such a way that
courts' increased likelihood of granting limited liability merely reflects a
different factual composition of the adjudicated cases. In any event, the
apparent trend cannot necessarily be ascribed to increasing judicial con-
cern for equitable concerns such as "fairness" or "justice."
44. Areeda and Turner observe in another context that" 'fairness' is a vagrant claim applied to
any value that one happens to favor." PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 13
(1978).
45. Fritz Ziegler, Comment, De Facto Incorporation and Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence
in Louisiana, 37 LA. L. REv. 1121, 1122 (1977) (citations omitted).
46. See, eg., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Weatherhogg, 4 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 1936)
("The doctrine that members of a corporation defacto are protected from liability as partners seems
to be generally adopted in more recent cases.... ").
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C. Defective Incorporation and Piercing the Corporate Veil
If existing analyses provide so little understanding of defective incor-
poration, where else might one turn? One possibility is suggested by the
realization that the defective incorporation cases present issues that are
the reverse of those in cases about "piercing the corporate veil." The
essence of the defective corporation doctrines is that, under certain (here-
tofore unclear) conditions, courts may accord limited liability to firm
owners who have failed to perform the statutory requirements for a de
jure corporation. Cases of piercing the veil concern denial of limited lia-
bility under certain conditions even though firm owners have completed
the statutory requirements for a de jure corporation.47
Occasionally commentators have noted in passing the similarity be-
tween defective incorporation and piercing the veil.48 Apparently no one
has investigated the possibility that the factors accounting for decisions
in the latter domain may also explain the rules applied to defective incor-
poration.49 The idea that a single explanation might apply to domains as
similar as piercing the corporate veil and defective incorporation has ob-
vious intuitive appeal.50 But until recently, no one could explain coher-
ently the body of piercing the veil cases, either. Indeed, the opinions
were afflicted with an enormous number of "verbal characterizations, ep-
47. Also like de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel, piercing the veil is an extra-
statutory, even anti-statutory judicial doctrine, because completion of the statutory formalities sup-
posedly bars any challenge to the firm's corporate status by anyone but the state. RMBCA
§ 2.08(b). But while the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act have actively sought to
suppress the doctrines of defective incorporation, see supra text accompanying notes 37-39, they
have held no such animus toward judicial discretion in piercing the veil, despite the statute's seem-
ingly mandatory language on limited liability for owners of de jure corporations. RMBCA § 6.22.
48. "Disregard of corporateness in various cases of technically-correct incorporation--often
called 'piercing the corporate veil'-is the converse of the recognition of corporateness in instances
of defective incorporation." HENN AND ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 344. Frey mentioned pierc-
ing the veil on the first page of his article, in discussing limited liability generally, but he did not
consider whether the standards applied in those cases might explain the defective incorporation cases
which he analyzed. Frey, supra note 3, at 1153.
49. Traditionally, the subject of defective incorporation is taught as part of the material on how
to form a corporation. See, ag., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS (4th ed. 1990). But see CHARLES R. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (1992) (juxtaposing piercing the veil and defective incorpora-
tion as two aspects of the overall issue of allocating risk between corporate insiders and outsiders).
Many estimable texts and treatises on corporate law discuss piercing the veil but ignore defective
incorporation problems. See, eg., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986); FRANK H. EAS-
TERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
50. See generally J. TREFIL, READING THE MIND OF GOD: IN SEARCH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNIVERSALITY (1989).
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ithets, and metaphors" that obscured rather than elucidated any true the-
ory or principle running through the cases." For lack of any coherent
judicial substance, the traditional explanations of courts' veil-piercing ra-
tionales were-like explanations of the defective incorporation cases-
unhelpfully couched in terms of fairness, equity, and the like. 2
Recent analyses of piercing the veil are more rigorous, however. Eas-
terbrook and Fischel, 3 building on an earlier contribution by Manne,54
hypothesize that piercing the veil should predictably occur when the eco-
nomic benefits ordinarily available from limited liability are not present
or when a grant of limited liability would entail relatively high costs. 5
The principal benefit of limited liability, Easterbrook and Fischel argue,
is facilitating the division of labor in large public corporations. In partic-
ular, the costs of raising capital, monitoring its use, transferring its own-
ership, and diversifying investors' portfolios all decline with limited
liability. The principal cost of limited liability is the undesirable incen-
tive it creates for firm owners to impose negative externalities on others
because their investment is the limit of their potential liability.
This model of limited liability leads Easterbrook and Fischel to offer
four predictions-all empirically testable-about when courts will over-
ride statutory limited liability and pierce the corporate veil. First, pierc-
ing the veil should occur mostly in small corporations, in which the gains
from division of labor and thus the benefits of limited liability are mi-
nor. 6 Second, piercing the veil should occur disproportionately in par-
ent-subsidiary contexts in which it "does not create unlimited liability for
any people. Thus, the benefits of diversification, liquidity, and monitor-
ing by the capital market are unaffected." 57 Third, because contracting
51. HEN AND ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 344 n.2 (providing numerous examples). See
also P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS 8 (1983). In general, until recently, no
underlying principles seemed to explain veil-piercing decisions. "'Piercing' seems to happen freak-
ishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus that the whole area of
limited ability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in corpo-
rate law." Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 89, 89 (1985).
52. "The test is simply whether or not recognition of corporateness would produce unjust or
undesirable consequences inconsistent with the purpose of the concept [of limited liability]." HENN
AND ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 346.
53. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51.
54. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967).
55. For a more general discussion of limited liability and its implications for other areas of
corporate law, see Ribstein, supra note 4.
56. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 109-10.
57. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 111.
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parties will force the corporation to pay for any increased risks created
by the possibility of limited liability, the temptation toward externalities
is largely limited to future torts. Hence, courts should more likely disre-
gard the corporate veil in tort cases, particularly those in which the firm
undertook relatively risky activities."8 Finally, because intentional un-
dercapitalization is a particular way to avoid the firm's tort liabilities, it
will frequently cause courts to pierce the veil.5 9
Robert Clark hypothesizes that a different rationale should explain the
veil-piercing cases.6' Consistent with his grander theme that much cor-
porate law is really a specific application of more general fraudulent con-
veyance law, Clark believes that judges pierce the veil when shareholders
have used the corporate form fraudulently. 6 Some shareholders might
perpetrate fraud to induce extension of credit that would otherwise not
be extended; for example, a firm might overstate its value. But creditors
can guard against this sort of fraud by making their own investigations at
the time of the loan. Subsequently, however, the corporate form can be
used to hinder a bona fide creditor in his attempt to collect his debt; for
example, the firm might pay unusually high dividends. It is in these situ-
ations-use of the corporate form to escape legitimate debts, rather than
to advance more productive corporate purposes-that Clark expects to
find courts piercing the veil.
The Easterbrook and Fischel and the Clark Articles derive from a
common belief that the verbal formulae of judicial holdings ("alter ego"
and so forth) are less helpful in understanding and predicting case out-
comes than a model of what judges are really trying to achieve in these
cases: "balance the benefits of limited liability against its costs" for Eas-
terbrook and Fischel,6 2 penalizing "behavior that would invoke fraudu-
lent conveyance law" for Clark.6 3 Because they proceed from different
constructs, the implications of the two models are not always
comparable. 4
But the two models do yield some different implications. First, as
58. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 112.
59. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 113.
60. CLARK, supra note 49.
61. CLARK, supra note 49, at 71-74.
62. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 109.
63. CLARK, supra note 49, at 72.
64. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel do not discuss use of the corporate form to perpe-
trate fraud on creditors, and Clark does not indicate whether fraudulent conveyance is more likely
by a parent owning a subsidiary corporation or by non-corporate shareholders of a corporation.
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noted above, Easterbrook and Fischel state that courts pierce the veil
most often in tort cases.6" Clark states the opposite, that since piercing
the veil is about fraud, most such cases concern contracts.6 6 Likewise,
again in contrast to the prediction of Easterbrook and Fischel, Clark says
inadequate capitalization should not be an important factor leading
courts to pierce the veil because contracting parties will reflect the risk
premium associated with the firm's level of wealth in the terms of their
agreement. 67
Both the Easterbrook and Fischel and Clark discussions of veil pierc-
ing are noteworthy. Unlike too much writing about the law, each con-
tains a model of the process being considered and clearly specifies
implications of the model. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
implications are empirically falsiflable.68 Thus, readers can decide who is
right, depending on what the empirical evidence shows.
But like too much economic writing about the law, both sides claim
empirical victory without empirical evidence. 69 For an empirical resolu-
tion of the conflicting claims, one must turn to Robert Thompson's re-
cent study, in which he reviewed some 1600 cases to determine "the
nature of the corporations, the plaintiffs, the courts, and the reasons
given by the courts for piercing or not piercing the corporate veil."'70 His
investigation included the empirical implications raised by Easterbrook
65. Reasoning similar to Easterbrook and Fischel's has led other commentators also relying on
economics to call for an end to corporate limited liability in tort cases. See Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J.
1879 (1991); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30
U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980).
66. CLARK, supra note 49, at 78-79. One exception is the case where the tort victim has already
reduced her claim to judgment, at which point the firm owners begin to shift assets out of the firm to
the owners personally to defeat the victim's claim. However, this is no different from an ordinary
fraudulent conveyance in a contract setting. CLARK, supra note 49, at 80.
67. CLARK, supra note 49, at 74, 81.
68. For further discussion of the desirability of greater methodological rigor in economic analy-
ses of law, see Fred S. McChesney, Positive Economics and All That: A Review of Easterbrook and
Fischel's Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 272 (1992).
69. See McChesney, supra note 68. In one area where the models differ sharply in their predic-
tions, whether courts pierce the veil more frequently in tort or contract cases, Easterbrook and
Fischel state that "Courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in tort than in contract
cases." The authors support this empirical statement with a single case and a 1929 law review
article. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 112 & n.41. Similarly, Clark claims that "[a]
careful review" of the cases indicates that only "[v]ery rarely" does inadequate capitalization by
itself lead a court to pierce the veil, but he offers no such review. CLARK, supra note 49, at 74.
70. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036 (1991).
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and Fischel and by Clark. In areas in which the two models differed, the
evidence supported Clark. Courts pierce the veil more frequently in con-
tract than in tort cases, and are particularly sensitive to the potential for
fraud.71 Also, contrary to Easterbrook and Fischel's predictions, under-
capitalization does not appear to be an important rationale for piercing
the veil.72 Overall, "[t]he results seem to confirm Robert Clark's point
that the most recurring problems in the piercing area are fraudulent
transfers and similar contract related claims."' 73 Finally, Thompson also
found that a defendant's status in the firm-serving as an active manager
rather than a passive investor-increased the likelihood that courts
would pierce the veil.74 Activity in the firm is not ordinarily viewed as
relevant to piercing the corporate veil, nor do Easterbrook and Fischel or
Clark discuss it, yet it apparently influences judicial decisions whether to
respect or abrogate limited liability.
D. Piercing the Veil Models and Defective Incorporation
If courts determine whether to maintain limited liability for owners of
de jure corporations according to the reasons advanced either by Easter-
brook and Fischel or by Clark, one would think that the same reasons
would be important in courts' determinations whether to award limited
liability to owners of defective incorporations. Under the Easterbrook
and Fischel model, limited liability would be granted more readily when
establishment of the firm required raising capital from several dispersed
shareholders, who would not have invested if the investment involved
exposure to unlimited personal liability. Under the Easterbrook and Fis-
chel model, limited liability would be upheld rarely in parent-subsidiary
cases. Limited liability would be upheld less frequently in tort cases,
71. "[C]ourts pierce the veil in almost all cases in which they find misrepresentation. But even
if misrepresentation cases are deleted from the contract and tort cases, courts still pierce more often
in contract than in tort." Thompson, supra note 70, at 1059.
72. "jUlndercapitalization is not among the factors most frequently cited by the courts in pierc-
ing the veil, nor is it among the factors associated with the greatest likelihood of piercing. The
relative infrequency with which courts cite undercapitalization in tort-related piercing cases suggests
it is an issue that appeals to commentators for reasons other than its predictive significance."
Thompson, supra note 70, at 1067.
73. Thompson, supra note 70, at 1068-69 (citation omitted).
74. "Defendants who served only as shareholders were less likely to be successful targets of
piercing suits than shareholders who also served as directors or officers. Further, in the few cases
that characterized potential defendants as passive shareholders rather than active in the business as
directors, officers, or otherwise, the courts almost always found no liability." Thompson, supra note
70, at 1056.
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where courts would be sensitive to the moral hazard problem leading
firm owners protected by limited liability to take supra-optimal risks and
to undercapitalize.
Under the Clark view, courts instead would be sensitive to the possibil-
ity of fraud in defective incorporation cases. The potential for fraud in
defective incorporation cases is similar to that in piercing the veil cases,
and courts in many of the cases identified by Frey did demonstrate con-
cern for this and other sorts of deceitful manipulation. For example, in
anticipation of protection by limited liability, owners of a defectively in-
corporated firm could shift money out of the firm to avoid its availability
to the firm's creditors.75 The defective corporation cases reveal other
ways that firms could defraud potential plaintiffs with incorrect claims
that the firm is a corporation. For the period of the Frey sample of cases,
for example, incorporation entailed satisfying minimum capital require-
ments; a plaintiff facing a firm described as a corporation might assume a
certain level of assets available that defendants had not actually in-
vested.76 In another case, a loan was obtained using stock certificates as
collateral when no shares had ever been issued nor the firm validly incor-
porated.77 A court could avoid these sorts of manipulations by denying
limited liability when incorporation was defective, just as it does by
piercing the veil.
In summary, investigations of defective incorporation have focused on
three factors: defendants' attempted compliance with the corporation
statute, plaintiffs' dealing with the defectively formed firm as a corpora-
tion, and the extent of defendants' activity in the firm. None of these
factors has seemed to furnish a consistent model to predict judicial grant
of limited liability for defective incorporation. However, investigations
of a closely related subject, judicial denial of limited liability for effective
incorporation, do apparently locate factors of predictive value in that do-
main, including defendants' attempted fraud and level of activity in the
firm.
Because the issues in defective incorporation are mirror images of
those in piercing the veil, the veil-piercing factors may help explain the
defective incorporation decisions. To determine whether the veil-pierc-
ing factors are beneficial in this context, a more fully specified model-
75. See, e-g., Christian & Craft Grocery Co. v. Fruitdale Lumber Co., 25 So. 566 (Ala. 1899).
76. See, eg., Crouch v. Gray, 290 S.W. 391 (Tenn. 1926). See also Burns v. Beck, 10 S.E. 121
(Ga. 1889); Davidson v. Hobson, 59 Mo. App. 130 (1894).
77. Provident Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 40 So. 778 (La. 1906).
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one that includes the traditional factors Frey considered in addition to
those in the veil-piercing cases-is needed. That, in turn, requires more
sophisticated statistical techniques than have been brought to bear on the
question.
The statistical inquiry that follows falls short of a fully specified eco-
nomic model, insofar as it makes no assumptions about what state of the
law is efficient or what judges seek to achieve (maximize) in deciding
defective incorporation cases.78 In part, this reflects the fact that the
literature on what judges maximize is only beginning to make empirical
headway on the question, particularly in common-law domains.79 More-
over, perhaps the most prevalent model-that judges maximize efficiency
in deciding common-law cases but adjudicate statutory cases to further
the aims of legislators 8°--is not immediately applicable to defective in-
corporation, which represents a common-law doctrine in derogation of
statute. Noting judges' "rather poor articulation" of the law of defective
incorporation, "with resultant scholarly confusion," one paper has sug-
gested recently that the modem defective incorporation cases can be un-
derstood as a type of judicial fine-tuning of the statutory scheme to
extract firms' rents through filing fees, taxes, and so forth. 1 While this
perspective seems promising a priori, it may be premature to conclude
that more traditional factors do not explain judges' opinions. Scholars'
perceptions of judges' doctrinal confusion may just as well reflect an in-
adequacy of scholarly empirical techniques.
78. However, the model presented and tested here necessarily assumes that judges correctly
report the facts of the cases that they decide. See infra note 106.
79. See, e.g., Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129
(1980) (presenting evidence judges' decisions apparently not motivated by desire for promotion).
But see Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing 12
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 12 (1992) (presenting evidence that judges in antitrust cases are motivated
by promotion opportunities); Harold W. Elder, Property Rights Structures and Criminal Courts: An
Analysis of State Criminal Courts, 7 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 21 (1987) (presenting evidence of
political influence on judicial criminal decisions).
80. Concerning the common law, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
325-27 (1st ed. 1972); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977); but see Peter H. Aranson, The Common Law as Central Economic Planning, 3 CON. PO.
ECON. 289 (1992). Concerning statutory law, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975). For an ex-
tended discussion of the Landes-Posner model and several empirical studies that corroborate it, see
WILLIAM F. SHUGHART, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-GROuP POLITICS 121-27 (1990).
81. Anastassiou & Haddock, The Law and Economics of Defective Incorporation 2 (manu-
script 1992).
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Problems with Traditional Empirical Modes
Though clearly an advance in the level of corporate law discourse, the
rethinking begun by Clark and by Easterbrook and Fischel and carried
forward by Thompson is not wholly satisfactory methodologically.
Merely counting cases and sorting them into various pigeonholes accord-
ing to expressed judicial rationales (the process used by Thompson for
veil-piercing cases and by Frey in studying defective incorporation) suf-
fers from at least two deficiencies relevant to analyzing defective
incorporation. 2
First, the stated reasons for judges' holdings may not always explain
the complete rationale for their decisions. This is a familiar problem for
lawyers, who learn to distinguish cases not just on the basis of the explicit
holding but also on particular facts or subsidiary rationales (including
dicta) that are also recited in the cases. The basic point of both Clark
and of Easterbrook and Fischel is that courts' stated rationales for hold-
ings in the veil-piercing cases may not be very helpful to understanding
the true rationales underlying the decisions.
Second, courts typically designate more than one factor as relevant or
important in the ultimate decision, rather than expound a bright-line,
single-factor rule. Frey showed that the defective-incorporation cases,
supposedly comprehensible in terms of a single factor-attempted com-
pliance for de facto corporation, plaintiff's willingness to deal with the
firm as a corporation for corporation by estoppel-in fact manifest no
bright-line reasoning. This leaves open the possibility that several fac-
tors, rather than any single one, might explain the defective incorpora-
tion outcomes. In the veil piercing cases, Thompson found, "Courts
frequently give more than one reason for their decisions. "83
However, usefully discerning the relevant factors poses three potential
difficulties. The first is the sheer calculation problem entailed in examin-
ing the variety of factual configurations present when multiple factors are
at work. The second difficulty is assigning weights to the different fac-
82. Thompson is aware of the methodological shortcomings of merely sorting cases, and re-
ports that he is at work on a multiple regression model for the veil-piercing cases. See Thompson,
supra note 70, at 1046 n.62. For another, more complex, instance of empirics by case-sorting, see
Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic Model and an Empirical Test,
29 AM. Bus. L.J. 535 (1992).
83. Thompson, supra note 70, at 1045.
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tors. Finally, it is often difficult to disentangle the separate effects of
factors that tend to operate simultaneously.
L Calculation Difficulties 8 4
Any quantitative analysis of the reasons for case holdings will proba-
bly encounter daunting computational problems, if only from the sheer
number of possible factual situations presented by the cases. Frey identi-
fies three factors, attempted compliance, plaintiff's belief about the firm's
corporateness, and defendant's activity in the firm, as potentially relevant
independent variables to explain whether defendant-owners of a defec-
tively incorporated firm will ultimately be shielded by limited liability. A
fourth variable, whether limited liability is granted, is dependent on (i.e.,
a function of) the other three. In the simplest model, each of the four
variables can take on two values: compliance was or was not attempted,
plaintiff did or did not deal with the firm as a corporation, defendant was
active or inactive in managing the firm, limited liability was or was not
granted. Thus, there are 16 possible factual situations.85
In a more realistic model of judicial decisions, however, the number of
possible factual situations would be even greater, because the three in-
dependent variables (attempted compliance, plaintiffs belief about the
firm's corporate status, defendant's involvement in managing the firm)
would predictably not all be mentioned in each opinion. Each independ-
ent variable could then take on three values: present in the case, not pres-
ent, or not discussed. For example, statutory compliance could have
been attempted, not attempted, or not mentioned in the opinion. If one
includes the possibility that the opinion does not discuss the factor at all
the number of possible factual situations confronting the researcher is
increased to 54.6
Trying to sort out the importance of the many factors as they appear
in different factual combinations with the other factors obviously is an
84. The difficulties referred to here concern only the quantitative calculations themselves. An
anterior problem is the rule or criterion by which quantitative importance is to be measured.
Multiple regression, for example, derives its measures using the Gaussian criterion of minimizing the
sum of squared prediction errors. GARY SMITH, STATISTICAL REASONING 475-78 (2d ed. 1988).
But this is not the only possible criterion.
85. With four variables each taking on two possible values, the number of factual situations
that possibly may be encountered is 2' = 16.
86. With the three independent variables taking on three possible values, the number of possible
outcomes of the independent variables is 33 = 27. Since the dependent variable then can assume two
different values, the total number of outcomes is 2 X 27 = 54.
[Vol. 71:493
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/1
DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION
enormous task. But the magnitude of the computational problem also
depends on the size of the case sample studied; indeed, as the size of the
case sample grows, the task becomes superhuman. Yet relatively large
sample sizes are clearly desirable.87 The more cases sampled, the better
justified any inferences about the state of the law.88
2. Weighing of Different Factors
If more than one factor is present in a case, how is one to say what the
"real" reason for a particular decision is?89 The lawyer would probably
answer: as more of the important factors are present, the likelihood of
according limited liability increases; a single relevant factor might not
suffice, but as more and more are found the probability of one party or
the other prevailing changes. This response is not necessarily helpful and
may not even be true.
The response is not helpful because even if each supposed factor has
independent relevance in courts' decisions (an empirical question in it-
self), it is highly unlikely that courts give each factor equal weight. A
court predictably would not just tote up the number of factors present in
a given case; certain things would be more important than others. In the
doctrinal analysis of defective incorporation, for example, having at-
tempted to comply with the corporation statute is supposedly more im-
portant than defendant's being active or passive in managing the firm.
Simply registering the presence or absence of certain factors in the cases
cannot disclose the relative importance of each factor individually. This
87. At the other end of the spectrum from large-sample statistical analysis is "storytelling,"
currently enjoying an academic vogue. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). A story is just a
sample of one. The inferential value of the story naturally depends in part on whether, among other
things, the story is "typical" (i.e., close to the mean) of the experiences of others similarly situated.
Kg., id. at 838-40. Of course, the validity of statistical inferences also depends on the randomness of
the sample used. But samples greater than one also allow measure of the variance of experiences, not
just the means. The extent to which storytelling is a useful complement to or substitute for the sorts
of larger-sample statistical inference used in this article is not addressed here.
88. The intuitive sense that one's conclusions are better justified by increasing the number of
cases sampled reflects the underlying statistical truth that the margin of error in any statistical infer-
ence declines with increased sample sizes. See, e.g., SMrrH, supra note 84, at 343-45.
89. As one attempt to distill one state's defective incorporation cases concluded, "Providing a
completely accurate formulation of the two doctrines [de facto corporation and corporation by es-
toppel] as they were applied in Louisiana prior to 1968 is impossible .... Innumerable variations of
fact prevent isolating the effect of a single defect in formation. Authorities have complained of the
same difficulty when dealing with the many common law cases." Ziegler, supra note 45 (citing inter
alia Frey, supra note 3).
1993]
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problem with multi-variable tests is encountered frequently in the law,
including other areas of corporate law.9" Understandably, it is a frequent
source of complaints from practitioners who must divine for themselves
the relative importance of various factors set out indiscriminately in legal
opinions.91
3. Simultaneity of Several Factors
Moreover, it is not necessarily true that each factor presented in a
multi-factor list has a separate influence on the judicial outcome. Mere
taxonomy of case holdings based on the presence of certain factors does
not account for the simultaneous presence of other relevant variables that
may be the true cause of any supposed relationship. Consider the claim,
discussed above,92 that the passage of time is an important factor for
understanding the body of defective incorporation decisions. It is true, as
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, that the percentage of cases has risen in which
courts have granted limited liability despite the absence of de jure status.
But, simultaneous with the passage of time, other factors of relevance
may also have changed. Firm owners may have increasingly attempted
to comply with local incorporation statutes, for example, increasing the
likelihood that courts will adjudge the firm a de facto corporation.
To take an issue of perhaps even greater significance to the defective
incorporation cases, de facto corporations are commonly distinguished
from corporations by estoppel on the basis that the defendants' have at-
tempted to comply with the corporation statute. Yet as discussed above,
Frey reports that in all cases where courts found a de facto corporation
90. Ownership of corporate opportunities is one very vexing area not helped by the plethora of
tests, prongs, and factors cited by judges in the cases. For illustrative cases, see, e.g., Solimine v.
Hollander, 16 A.2d 203, 215 (N.J. Eq. 1940); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939).
91. For example, there is considerable unhappiness with the state of the law concerning puni-
tive damages, following the Supreme Court's opinion in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). The majority in Pacific Mutual approved Alabama's use of seven factors to
determine whether a punitive damage award violates the Due Process Clause. For a discussion of
the reaction to the opinion, see Paul M. Barrett, High Court Vagueness On Punitive Damages Leads
to Legal Chaos, WALL ST. J., March 24, 1993, at Al.
John Paul Stevens and Justice Blackmun [the author of the majority opinion] favor what
lawyers call multifactor balancing tests. These are legal standards consisting of lists of
relevant considerations, rather than clear-cut rules. Admirers of Justices Blackmun and
Stevens praise their attention to nuance; detractors argue that jurists trying to juggle too
many factors tend not to decide much. Whatever its potential advantages, the balancing
approach produces perplexity when it isn't clear which factors are most important or how
they should be weighed .... Besides not ranking the Alabama factors, the opinion didn't
indicate which, if any, were now mandatory for other states.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 45 & 46.
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(and so granted limited liability), plaintiffs had dealt with the firm as a
corporation anyway. Thus, in every case in which courts granted de
facto corporation status, application of the doctrine of corporation by
estoppel would have shielded defendants from personal liability. It
would be impossible, therefore, to decide from those cases whether at-
tempted compliance, plaintiff estoppel or both explained the judicial out-
come. However, the reverse is not true: many cases exist in which
plaintiff dealt with the firm as a corporation but the firm did not attempt
to comply with the statute. In some, but not all of those cases, courts
granted limited liability. All in all, then, what additional significance
does attempted compliance have? (Have corporate law teachers afflicted
students all these years with a bogus distinction between de facto corpo-
rations and corporations by estoppel?)
B. Regression Model and Data
Multiple regression is a statistical technique that can solve the
problems of calculating the influence of individual case factors, identify-
ing their relative weights, and accounting for the simultaneous presence
of different factors.93 This Article may be the first to use multiple regres-
sion to discern the separate legal reasons for judicial decisions in a purely
common-law domain. However, applications of regression analysis in
similar legal contexts show how it can be used to explain and even pre-
dict judicial decisions.94 Indeed, as Franklin Fisher has observed, it is
93. It must be admitted, however, that regression analysis sometimes may only provide a par-
tial solution to particular problems involving simultaneous appearances of two or more factors.
Known as "multicollinearity," this possible problem and its solutions are discussed in all basic re-
gression texts. See, e.g., A.H. STUDENMUND & HENRY J. CASSIDY, USING ECONOMETRICS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 179-208 (1987). The problem of multicollinearity in the context of the defective
incorporation cases is discussed further below.
94. For other examples of the technique, see Michael 0. Moore, Rules or Politics?: An Empiri-
calAnalysis ofITC Anti-Dumping Decisions, 30 ECON. INQ. 449 (1992); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri
L. Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1151 (1991); Malcom B. Coate et al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, 33 J. L. &
ECON. 463 (1990); Christopher C. Klein, Predation in the Courts: Legal Versus Economic Analysis in
Sham Litigation Cases, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 29 (1990); Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme
Court Cases Probablistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1963-1981, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 891
(1984).
Regression models have been used frequently to measure the impact of various factors on civil or
criminal sanctions. See, e g., Cohen, supra note 79; John L. Lott, An Attempt at Measuring the Total
Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of an Individual's Reputation, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 159 (1992); John L. Lott, Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30
ECON. INQ. 583 (1992); Phyllis Altroggee & William F. Shughart, II, The Regressive Nature of Civil
Penalties, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 55 (1984).
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difficult to see how anyone could reach conclusions in legal proceedings
involving large-sample, multivariable situations without resort to multi-
ple regression. 95
The sample of cases used here is that originally chosen by Frey.96 Frey
cited 123 cases of supposed defective incorporation, but surprisingly,
many of them did not involve that issue at all. 9 7 Culling those irrelevant
cases leaves a sample of 102 cases truly involving defective incorporation.
Use of the Frey cases was dictated for two reasons. First, Frey's analy-
sis remains the most often cited summary of the common law of defective
incorporation. Second, the rise of statutory intrusion into common law
was based on claims, exemplified by Frey's conclusions, that the judicial
holdings were indecipherable. Frey's conclusions, however, have never
been subjected to any sophisticated testing.98  One cannot assess the
proper role of the statutes without first investigating the performance of
the prior common law.99
The regression model used here models a court's decision whether to
accord limited liability to owners of a defectively incorporated firm.
95. Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 730
(1980). See also Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048
(1985); Michael O. Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1442 (1972).
96. This sample included cases from 1818 to 1945. The 1818 case, however, is the only one
prior to 1860 in Frey's sample. Frey reports that his study is based on an analysis of "all the re-
ported American cases." Frey, supra note 3, at 1156. It is unclear what he means; certainly not all
defective incorporation cases are included in the sample reported in his article. But there is no
reason to think that his sample is anything other than a random sample. A major point of the
present Article, in any event, is a demonstration of how better statistical techniques would lead to
very different conclusions concerning Frey's survey.
97. For example, in several cases that Frey included as supposedly involving defective incorpo-
ration, the court clearly held that the firm was a valid de jure corporation. See Moe v. Harris, 172
N.W. 494 (Minn. 1919); First Nat'l Bank of Deadwood v. Rockefeller, 93 S.W. 761 (Mo. 1906).
98. Simultaneous with Frey's analysis, different state corporation statutes began to adopt ver-
sions of the MBCA, which attempted to abolish the common-law doctrines of defective incorpora-
tion. See supra text accompanying notes 10 & 37-39. The different versions of the statutes actually
adopted, plus the fact that the statutes are often ignored by judges, see Bradley, supra note 7, would
now make it vastly more difficult to analyze the factors that govern the law of defective incorpora-
tion. The question addressed here remains, however: was the common law of defective incorpora-
tion so unprincipled that statutory intervention was warranted in the first place?
99. The possible disadvantage of using the classic common-law decisions, of course, is the un-
certainty whether the same decision rules are being followed today in defective incorporation cases.
But again, the passage of statutes designed to remove judicial discretion in defective incorporation
situations already complicates, perhaps to the point of impossibility, the task of predicting modern
decisions.
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TABLE 1
LIST OF VARIABLES FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Dependent Variable: I = grant limited liability (43 cases)
0 = hold personally liable (59 cases)
Independent Variables: I = factor explicitly present
0 = factor not mentioned in opinion
Expected No.
Sign Cases
A. Traditional Variables (Frey)
1. Attempted Compliance with Statute + 58
2a. Plaintiff Dealt with Firm as Corporation + 59
2b. Plaintiff Did Not Deal with Firm as - 11
Corporation
3a. Defendant Passive in Firm Management + 12
3b. Defendant Active in Firm - 67
B. Variables Identified in Veil-Piercing Cases
4a. Need for Many Investors to Raise Capital + 20
4b. No Need for Many Investors to Raise Capital - 50
5. Tort Case +/- 3
6. Parent-subsidiary Corporation - 1
7a. Firm Undercapitalized - 7
7b. Firm Adequately Capitalized + 0
8. Risky Activity - 2
9a. Indication of Fraud - 16
9b. No Indication of Fraud + 12
C. Other
10a. Defendant Believed Firm a Corporation + 50
10b. Defendant Did Not Believe Firm a Corporation - 21
11. Limited Liability Granted in Lower Court + 53
That decision is estimated using probablistic analysis (probit),1 ° as a
function of the several independent (explanatory) variables shown in Ta-
ble 1. The explanatory variables are the factors identified in the more
traditional analysis of defective incorporation (variables 1 through 3b)
plus factors derived from the analysis of piercing the corporate veil (vari-
ables 4a through 9b)."' Table 1 also shows the number of instances,
100. In the probit model, Prob[LIMLIAB = 1] = f[aX], where f is the normal distribution
function and aX is a linear combination (to be estimated) of the explanatory variables, listed in Table
1. See R. HILL ET AL., THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ECONOMETRICS 767 (1985).
101. For several of the potentially relevant decision factors, it was useful to include two dummy
variables to allow for judges' failure to discuss the factor one way or the other. For example, with
perfect information, defendants' active or inactive role in the firm could have been treated with a
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from the 102-case sample, in which a particular variable was present and
the expected sign on each regression coefficient. Positive signs indicate
variables (e.g., attempted compliance) whose presence in a case one
would expect to increase the grant of limited liability; negative signs indi-
cate that the presence of the factor (e.g., possibility of fraud) is expected
to reduce the probability of limited liability.
Table 1 also lists three other variables. The first two (10a and 10b)
measure whether the defendant owner did or did not believe the firm was
a corporation.102 The final factor (variable 11), reports whether the court
below granted limited liability. Only one case in the Frey sample was a
trial court opinion.10 3 However, that case was discarded here because
the court held that the firm was a de jure corporation. Because the sam-
ple used for regression analysis included only appellate opinions, the
model was also estimated with an additional variable that measured
whether the lower court granted limited liability. Which party prevailed
in the lower court has been found to be a significant variable in other
regression analyses of court opinions. 1°4 As shown in Table 1, limited
liability was granted in the lower court in 53 of the 102 cases.
The data set for each factor listed in Table 1 was assembled as follows.
My research assistant and I read each case independently, separately not-
ing from the court's discussion which potentially relevant factors were
present in the case. We then compared notes. In almost all cases, our
perceptions were identical. In those unusual instances where our evalua-
tions did not match (typically, because it was difficult to tell whether or
single dummy variable. But whether defendant was active (variable 3a) or inactive (variable 3b)
could only be determined in 79 of the 102 cases. In the other 33, there was no judicial discussion of
the point. Thus, two variables were used. The first was coded 1 if the case made it clear that the
defendant was active in the firm; the second was likewise coded I if the defendant was clearly inac-
tive. If defendant's role in the firm was unclear, both variables were coded 0. The advantage of this
approach is that it takes into account judicial silence or ambiguity on a particular point. The disad-
vantage is the possibility of multicollinearity, in the event that silence or ambiguity arises in rela-
tively few cases. That problem is discussed further below.
102. Although defendant's belief is sometimes listed as a separate factor in the de facto corpora-
tion cases, it is thought to be largely captured by whether or not defendant attempted to comply with
the incorporation statute. See supra text accompanying note 19.
103. First National Bank of Salem v. Almy, 117 Mass. 476 (1875).
104. See, eg., Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 94, at 1182. I am grateful to Ted Eisenberg for
pointing out the importance of including a variable to measure the lower-court outcome. See also
Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Mhat Shapes Perceptions ofthe Federal Court System?, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 501 (1989) (discussing how judgment about a line of cases may differ, depending
whether the observer is studying the trial or appellate level).
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not the court had actually considered a certain factor), we reread the case
together and agreed as to what was being said.
Necessarily, some interpretation of the relevant data is required."0 5
But of course, interpretation is precisely what lawyers are routinely
taught to do in deciding which factors are important in explaining
judges' decisions. Thus, the exercise here is no different from what law-
yers are supposed to do anyway. However, unlike traditional lawyering,
assembling a systematic data set permits more sophisticated statistical
testing and measurement of the significance and relative weights of the
different factors mentioned by courts in the sample cases.10 6
Preliminarily, Table 1 provides several interesting insights about the
defective incorporation cases. First, in the entire sample of 102 cases,
courts granted limited liability 43 times. But there were 59 cases in
which either statutory compliance was attempted or the plaintiff dealt
with the firm as a corporation-often, both factors were present. Thus,
in almost 30 percent of the cases, presence of the supposedly sufficient
factors for status as a de facto corporation or corporation by estoppel still
did not result in limited liability.
Second, certain factors identified ex ante as possibly relevant to the
grant of limited liability are almost totally absent from the defective in-
corporation sample. Only a few cases involved torts (variable 5),1o7 a
parent-subsidiary relationship (variable 6),"10 discussion of capitalization
105. Courts routinely report some items, such as whether statutory compliance was attempted.
Other items, such as whether defendants were active or passive in the firm and whether the firm's
ownership structure entailed relatively large numbers of dispersed investors, had to be gleaned from
more indirect evidence. For the latter, the deciding factor was often whether the business was fam-
ily-owned (a very frequent occurrence) versus whether it was the sort of firm (railroad, bank) for
which large numbers of dispersed owners typically would be expected.
106. It is assumed that judges correctly report the facts in their opinions, rather than concoct
facts to support their decision. See supra note 78. An alternative method is to estimate the factors
of importance to higher courts by using the facts of the case as found by the trial court. See, e.g.,
Segal, supra note 94, at 894. That approach is impossible here, however, because no published trial
court opinions exist in many (if not most) of the cases.
107. For examples of two tort cases, see infra note 110. The absence of tort cases is surprising,
as they make up an appreciable percentage (though not a majority) of the cases on piercing the
corporate veil. Thompson, supra note 70, at 1058-59. Frey's evidence has been misinterpreted in
this respect. About one quarter of his sample is reported to involve cases where plaintiffs' dealings
with the firm were "not on a corporate basis," a phrase often interpreted to mean "not on a contrac-
tual basis," i.e., a tort. See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 49, 252. Frey makes clear, however, that
most of his cases designated as "not on a corporate basis" were ones in which plaintiffs contracted
with the firm without knowing whether it was a corporation. Frey, supra note 3, at 1160.
108. Granby Mining & Smelting Co. v. Richards, 8 S.W. 246 (Mo. 1888).
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(variables 7a and 7b), 10 9 or risky acts (variable 8).110 Thus, these vari-
ables are deleted from the regression tests"' leaving the following: at-
tempted compliance; plaintiffs' and defendants' beliefs about whether the
firm was incorporated; whether defendants were active or passive in the
firm; whether the firm had a large number of dispersed owners; whether
or not fraud appeared to be involved; and whether the lower court had
granted limited liability.
Because few litigated cases exist in the categories omitted does not nec-
essarily mean that there are few disputes of those sorts; litigated cases are
not a random sample of overall disputes. 12 However, the works by
Frey, Easterbrook and Fischel, and Clark are specifically directed at the
litigated cases only, as are other commentators' complaints about the in-
decipherability of defective incorporation doctrines. 113 The Model Act's
campaign to abolish defective incorporation has likewise been based on
claims about the published cases.1 14
The simple correlation coefficients for the included variables are shown
in Table 2. One notes a relatively high correlation between the two vari-
ables measuring a plaintiff's belief that he was (PBELIEF) or was not
(NOPBELIEF) dealing with a corporation. Likewise, and perhaps not
surprisingly, there is a relatively high and positive correlation between
109. See, ag., Bank of De Soto v. Reed, 109 S.W. 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); Pettis v. Atkins, 60
Ill. 454 (1871).
110. The two cases in which the firm seemed to pursue unusually risky activities were Frawley v.
Tenaly Transp. Co., 113 A. 242 (N.J. 1921) (firm operated jitney buses, which collided and injured
plaintiff-passengers); Smith v. Warden, 86 Mo. 382 (1885) (firm whose boiler exploded, injuring
plaintiff as she sat in her home, maintained a plant for slaughter cattle, canning beef and shipping in
middle of a city).
I 1l. Intuitively, exclusion is appropriate because, if the sample reveals few instances of a partic-
ular independent variable actually occurring, its effects cannot be measured from the data. Techni-
cally, the exclusion is necessary, because inclusion creates extreme multicollinearity problems. See
supra text accompanying note 93. Indeed, the problems in this case were fatal; inclusion of the
variables resulted in such near-singular matrices that regression computations were impossible. See
A. STUDENMUND & H. CASSIDY, supra note 93, at 42
112. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 14 J. LEG.
STUD. 1 (1984). See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 28 J. EcON. LIT. 1067 (1989). To what extent nonlitigated disputes
concerning defective incorporation differ from the litigated cases is a subject not discussed in this
Article. Inferences from the cases must also be tempered by the possibility that published and un-
published opinions in litigation may differ. See Peter Seigelman & John J. Donohue, III, Studying
the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination
Cases, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 1133 (1990). But again, commentators' principal complaints about
defective incorporation (as with piercing the veil) concern the published opinions.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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the defendant's disbelief that a corporation was organized (NODBE-
LIEF) and a court's suspicion that defendant attempted to defraud the
plaintiff (FRAUD). There is also a high and negative correlation be-
tween NODBELIEF and defendant's attempted compliance (COM-
PLY), the reason given by commentators for courts' often failing to treat
as a separate factor defendants' beliefs about whether their firm is a cor-
poration. 115 Finally, one observes relatively high, negative correlation in
two sets of paired variables: the variables measuring defendants' involve-
ment in the firm (ACTIVE and INACTIVE) and those for the pattern of
shareholding (DISPERSE versus NODISPERS) in the firm.
C. Results
The probit parameter estimates appear in Table 3, which reports three
regressions.116 Regression I includes all variables (except those whose
deletion was discussed above). All variable coefficients have the pre-
dicted signs. The variables measuring defendants' attempted compliance,
plaintiffs' dealing with the firm as a corporation or not, defendants' pas-
sivity in the firm, the presence or absence of fraud, and the lower court's
grant of limited liability are all statistically significant at conventional
levels of Type I error. In other words, not only are attempted compli-
ance and plaintiff beliefs about the corporateness of the firm important,
but so too are the defendants' passivity in the firm and the court's percep-
tion regarding possible fraud involved in defective incorporation.
Regression I shows that the variables (variables 4a and 4b in Table 1)
that measure the firm's need for many dispersed investors have an insig-
nificant effect on a court's decision to grant limited liability." 7 Regres-
sion II then reports the effect of excluding those unimportant variables
on the other variables. As shown in Table 3, few important empirical
inferences change. Attempted compliance, plaintiffs' beliefs about the
firm as a corporation, defendants' active or passive role in the firm,
courts' concerns about fraud, and the result below remain significant
predictors of the decision to grant limited liability.
115. See supra text accompanying note 36.
116. These were the only regressions run, except as reported elsewhere in the text. See Edward
Learner, Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 31 (1983).
117. This result may well be due to collinearity between the two variables, discussed in connec-
tion with Table 2 in the text. Multicollinearity would reduce the overall size of the I-statistics and
thereby lower reported significance levels. See A. STUDENMIND & H. CASSIDY, supra note 111, at
184.
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TABLE 3
PROBIT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GRANT OF LIMITED LIABILITY
Regression
Constant
Defendants Attempted
Compliance
Plaintiffs Believed
Was Corporation
Plaintiffs Believed
Was Not Corporation
Defendants Believed
Was Corporation
Defendants Believed
Was Not Corporation
Defendants Active
in Firm
Defendants Passive
in Firm
Dispersed Investments
Required
Dispersed Investments
Not Required
Fraud Possibly
Involved
No Fraud Involved
Limited Liability Below
Likelihood Ratio Test =
Pseudo R-Squared =
Fraction of Cases
Correctly Predicted =
n = 102
* = significant at .01.
** = significant at .05.
= significant at .10.
(Absolute t-statistics in parentheses)
- 1.871* - 1.863* - 1.8659*
(2.92) (3.32) (3.59)
1.177* 1.126* 1.248*
(2.89) (2.87) (3.36)
1.022* 1.004* 1.050*
(2.57) (2.56) (2.78)
-2.115** - 1.883** - 1.599***
(1.72) (1.69) (1.48)
0.325 0.383
(0.82) (1.00)
-0.849 -1.129
(0.94) (1.28)
-0.487 -0.580*** -0.517***
(1.12) (1.42) (1.33)
1.634** 1.462** 1.759*
(2.05) (1.94) (2.41)
0.238 -
(0.49)
-0.371
(0.80)
- 1.662*** - 1.524*** -2.194**
(1.55) (1.76) (1.95)
1.741** 1.576** 1.488**
(2.079) (1.98) (2.10)
1.008* 1.017* 0.958*
(2.692) (2.760) (2.720)
74.74*
.834
87/102
73.04*
.826
85/102
68.43*
.802
87/102
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
528 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
In regressions I and II, defendants' own beliefs about whether they
were incorporated have marginal influence empirically on judges' limited
liability decisions. Holding constant all other variables, that is, defend-
ants' independent understanding about whether their firm is a corpora-
tion apparently count for naught, statistically, in what judges do.l"" In
regression III of Table 3, therefore, the variables measuring defendants'
understandings about their firms (variables 10a and 10b in Table 1)
are deleted and the equation re-estimated. The results are qualitatively
the same as before, except that deletion of the variables concerning
defendants' beliefs about whether their firm was truly a corporation in-
creases the size and significance levels of the variable measuring the pos-
sibility of fraud. 19
Not surprisingly, in view of all the other results, the likelihood ratio
and the pseudo R-squared statistics are quite high, regardless of the
model estimated. Likewise, all specifications are highly predictive, cor-
rectly predicting about 85 percent of the case outcomes. Table 4 shows
the distribution of predicted versus actual instances of limited liability
granted (coded 1) or refused (0), using the estimates from regression III.
As discussed in section II above, in only 58 percent of the cases in which
TABLE 4
PREDICTED AND ACTUAL CASE OUTCOMES
Predicted
(from regression III, Table 3)
[0] [1] TOTAL
[0] 53 6 59
Actual
[1] 9 34 43
TOTAL 62 40 102
statutory compliance was attempted and 33 percent of the cases where
plaintiff dealt with the firm as a corporation was limited liability granted.
118. But recall that the correlation between two variables is relatively high, as discussed in con-
nection with Table 2 in the text. The correlation between NODBELIEF and FRAUD is also rela-
tively high. Thus, the reported non-significance of the variables concerning defendants' beliefs may
well be an artifact of multicollinearity. See supra notes 93, 117.
119. This is perhaps not surprising, given the collinearity between defendants' not believing the
firm was a corporation and court's concern about fraud, as discussed in connection with Table 2
above.
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By specifying a model that includes both factors and contains additional
factors suggested theoretically, one increases substantially the ability to
predict actual case outcomes.
Finally, to test the claim that grants of limited liability in defective
incorporation cases are somehow just a function of the passage of time,
as some have claimed and as the time trend of the case outcomes seem-
ingly validates,12 a trend variable was created and included in the
model. The earliest case (1818) was coded zero, and for every subse-
quent case the number of years since 1818 was noted. When added to the
model estimated in regression III, the time-trend variable was actually
negative, although insignificantly different from zero (t = -. 510), with
the signs and significance levels of the other explanatory variables
unchanged.
IV. INTERPRETATION
These empirical results have useful implications for the law and the
way it is presented to students and to courts. The implications concern,
most obviously, the doctrines of defective incorporation. However, the
implications also extend to the way that defective incorporation relates to
other doctrines of corporate law and to the very process of legal
reasoning.
A. Towards a Single Doctrine of Defective Incorporation
Defective incorporation is typically presented as consisting of two sets
of legal dogma, vaguely related doctrinally but applied in different fac-
tual situations. De facto corporation is based on the notion that courts
should not deprive defendants of limited liability for some technical de-
fect in their filing, and thus largely depends on defendants' actions. Cor-
poration by estoppel is based on the notion that plaintiffs should not
obtain unlimited personal liability against persons with whom they were
content to contract on the basis of limited liability, and thus depends
particularly on plaintiffs' actions.
It is perhaps understandable that two doctrinal strains should develop,
since they seem to grow out of two unrelated strains of contact law.
120. A simple regression of the percentage of cases granting limited liability on the time trend
variable described in the text shows a significant, positive relationship, as the mapping in Figure 1
would suggest.
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There is no general doctrine of "substantial compliance" with statutes,, 21
but any business firm, including the corporation, is largely an extra-statu-
tory contract-based entity. 22 In addition, the issue of defective incorpo-
ration arises almost exclusively in a contractual context, as noted above.
"Substantial compliance" with a corporation statute (so as to attain de
facto corporation status) has an analogue in the contract law doctrine of
substantial performance. Likewise, estopping plaintiff from denying his
willingness to deal with the firm as a corporation is analogous to estop-
ping one who willingly makes a promise on which another relies, i.e.,
promissory estoppel. But in contract law, the doctrines of substantial
performance and estoppel are not related to one another in any obvious
ways, suggesting perhaps that de facto corporation (requiring substantial
compliance) and corporation by estoppel should and would also be dis-
tinct concepts.
Yet, the defective incorporation cases themselves indicate that no such
"bright-line" distinction exists. Frey's sample had already indicated that
it is not unusual for defendants to seek to comply with the statute and at
the same time for plaintiffs to deal with defendant(s) as a corporation.
The empirical results here indicate that both factors affect judges' deci-
sions in common-law defective incorporation situations. Given an at-
tempt to comply with the statute, plaintiff's dealing with the firm as a
corporation increases the likelihood of limited liability; given plaintiff's
dealings with the firm as a corporation, attempted compliance increases
the likelihood of limited liability. At the margin, courts will more likely
accord defendants limited liability when they have tried to comply and
plaintiffs have treated the firm as a corporation.
Thus, one should not view the cases as falling into the two traditional
boxes, de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel. The results
here make it easier to understand (if not excuse) judges' frequent inability
to enunciate a clear distinction in the two subsets of cases. Evaluated by
what they do, not by what they say, judges apply one unitary doctrine-
that of defective incorporation. That doctrine should be viewed as con-
121. But see SAMUEL GREEN & JOHN V. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS
80-81 (1984) ("Common-law marriage has been defined as 'a nonceremonial or informal marriage by
agreement, entered into by a man and a woman having capacity to marry, ordinarily without com-
pliance with such statutory formalities as those pertaining to marriage licenses .... ' Common-law
marriages frequently are the result of a defective ceremonial marriage.' "); John H. Langbein, Sub-
stantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 489, 489-531 (1975).
122. For a recent discussion, see the papers presented at the symposium, Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, collected in 89 COLUM. L. Rav. 1395 (1989).
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sisting of several factors, including defendants' attempt to comply with
the statute and plaintiffs' treatment of the firm as a corporation. How-
ever, neither is sufficient; each merely adds to the likelihood that limited
liability will be recognized. The apparent confusion shown by many
judges in distinguishing the two doctrines reflects the fact that they are
really not two doctrines at all.
Moreover, other factors are also important in the overall decision
whether to grant limited liability. Evaluated by their decisions, courts
apparently care whether defendants were active or passive in the firm.
Likewise, courts pay attention to whether confusion about the firm's cor-
porate status may have been created or used to deceive or defraud. These
are factors heretofore ignored when commentators and teachers explain
defective incorporation---except to the extent that terms like "fairness"
and "equity" can be said to capture them.
B. Towards a Unified Doctrine of Limited Liability: Defective
Incorporation and Piercing the Veil
The results here also indicate that lawyers' traditional dichotomy be-
tween the doctrines of piercing the corporate veil and defective incorpo-
ration should be revised. The inquiry in this Article was motivated to a
considerable extent by the theoretical and empirical progress made by
others in identifying the factors of importance in veil-piercing cases. Pre-
dictably, the same factors that induce judges to disallow limited liability
when the statutory formalities have been completed would also play a
role in their decisions to allow limited liability when the formalities have
not been completed. One finds that the cases actually are similar in sev-
eral respects.
In particular, judges' concern about potential fraud has significant in-
fluence in both sets of cases. The defective incorporation cases thus rein-
force the lesson already learned from the veil-piercing cases, that the
limited liability cases are largely related to contract-type problems. 123
Very few defective incorporation cases involve torts; tort-related
problems potentially created by limited liability (undercapitalization, in-
creased riskiness of firm activities) are virtually nonexistent in the cases.
Plaintiffs' contractual understandings, defendants' involvement in the
123. Again, this finding concerns litigated cases only, and has no necessary implications for the
set of all disputes that arise in the defective incorporation context.
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firm's contracting and concerns about deception are the dominant factors
that explain courts' decisions.
C. Holdings vs. Dicta
Finally, the empirical significance of defendants' activity in the firm
and judges' perceptions of possible fraud is important for more than the
way defective incorporation itself is understood. Generally, lawyers are
taught to distinguish (and help judges distinguish) holdings from dicta.
That distinction depends on yet another "bright-line," differentiating
things that judges say form the basis of their decision (the holding) from
other factors that are mentioned but supposedly are not determinative
(dicta). A social scientist, hearing a lawyer explain what dicta are, would
probably ask why judges bother in the first place to write about things
that play no role in their decision. The empirical results here on defec-
tive incorporation suggest that putative dicta in fact do play a role in
what judges decide, and thus explain why judges write them. In the de-
fective incorporation sample utilized here, almost no case includes de-
fendant passivity or the apparent absence of fraud in the decision
rationale, i.e., the holding. Yet the results here show that these two fac-
tors-figuring only as dicta-have a predictable and significant influence
on what judges actually decide.
V. CONCLUSION
Several professors of corporate law who commented on an earlier draft
of this Article admitted that the defective incorporation doctrine has
been a puzzle for most scholars. One professor referred to it as "an area
of doctrine that has long been mystifying to me," a second as a subject
"which I have always found mystifying." Another corporate law teacher
commented, "This is an area that I have always had trouble teaching
because I have never really been able to figure out [or] predict how a
court will decide the cases." A fourth reported he has "generally be-
lieved that when courts specify multiple factors they are just creating a
smoke screen for acting in an unprincipled manner."
In the face of the widespread perplexity, the results obtained here must
be counted helpful, though not of course conclusive. Resort to inchoate
notions of "fairness" and "justice" are unnecessary. The factors that
judges rely on in defective incorporation cases are identifiable and rather
specific. Assembling those factors into a multivariate model leads to the
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demonstration that most of those factors in fact have a significant impact
on judicial decisions. Perhaps better empirical evidence about what
courts have really done will reduce the uncertainty heretofore com-
plained of when judges have discretion to accord limited liability.
However, the lesson from the empirics extends further. In many in-
stances, what courts purport to do is reducible to terms amenable to
more sophisticated empirical work. Indeed, when courts purport to rely
on more than one or two factors in their decisions, it is hard to see how
one could confidently proclaim a line of cases chaotic without resort to
multivariate statistical techniques. When the law of a particular subject
consists of hundreds or even thousands of cases, the possible significance
of even two different factors-and certainly their relative weights in judi-
cial decisions-simply cannot be reliably assessed without statistical
techniques. Inability to work with large sample techniques thus creates
an incentive for researchers to draw inferences about the law by reading
an unnecessarily small sample of cases. That, in turn, increases the vari-
ance of inferences permissible and thus reduces the value of the exercise
in the first place.
The academic history of American law generally is replete with in-
stances in which scholars have proclaimed traditional common-law
modes of distilling "the law" from cases unworkable. Sometimes, as with
defective incorporation, the alternative embraced is specific to a particu-
lar line of cases, although the alternatives ("fairness," "justice") seem
rather unhelpful. But the more general claim that legal rules cannot be
winnowed from the cases sometimes stimulates academic attempts at
more overarching paradigm shifts in law, such as Legal Realism in the
1930s and Policy Science in the 1940s.124 One can only wonder whether
better empirical techniques, unavailable at the time, might have influ-
enced scholars' judgments regarding the workability of the more tradi-
tional approach to distilling the common law.12 5
Statistical modeling is not a substitute for doctrinal analysis (including
doctrinal analysis pursued by those with an economic bent). Statistics
124. For summaries of these schools of thought, see R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDU-
CATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 155-171, 264-288 (1983). For an empirical
discussion of the influence of these schools on the development of law, see Fred S. McChesney,
Intellectual Attitudes and Regulatory Change: An Empirical Investigation of Legal Scholarship in the
Depression, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 211 (1988).
125. However, as suggested by the current popularity of "storytelling" in law school discourse,
see supra note 87, the availability of more modem statistical methods will not necessarily cause
academics to utilize them before deciding that the traditional ways of case analysis are unhelpful.
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cannot create models of judicial decisions, only test them. It is the doc-
trinal analysis that must isolate the factors to be included in the statisti-
cal model, including analysis of supposed economic factors underlying
judicial decisions. Once potentially relevant factors are identified, the
empirical methodology is perfectly general. Statistics thus can usefully
complement any analysis of legal doctrine."2 6
The complementarity is the elementary one of substance and method.
As the case of defective incorporation shows, discerning the significance
and importance of several different factors invoked by judges in a large
sample of cases sometimes requires more sophisticated empirical meth-
odology than mere pigeonholing of cases. Traditional modes of legal
analysis in the area of defective incorporation have only produced confu-
sion and thus statutory attempts to abolish it-but not because the analy-
sis itself was wrong in any doctrinal sense. The doctrines themselves do
make sense. Why grant windfalls to plaintiffs who contract into limited
liability? Why protect defendants who attempt to cheat plaintiffs? The
problem, apparently, has been methodological. The apparent confusion
(and thus lack of predictability) about which factors are important in
judges' decisions has often negated the value of the defective incorpora-
tion doctrine itself. The results here indicate that the confusion is more
an artifact of researchers' deficient empirical methods.
126. See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 94, at 1194-95 ("Such analysis may generate a re-
thinking of any legal area to which it is applied.").
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